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SALE FOR YOU, SERVICE FOR

HIM,

BOTH FOR THE

TAXMAIm!
Ananth Padmanabhan & Giridharan Padmanabhan*

ABSTRACT
This articlestudies the evolution of the Parliament'sexperience and attempts
to incorporatea tax on services under its purview and also the expansion of
the scope of sales tax to included services. The paper begins with the attempts
of the State legislatures to expand the ambit of sales tax and the subsequent
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gannon Dunkerley. The paper
has traced the evolution of the State's attempts to continuously expand the
scope of its legislative authority to tax services and discusses the obvious
contraventionof the Federalstructureand division of legislativecompetence
which it has resulted in, and perhaps has been overlooked by the Judiciaryin
a series of decisions on the matter.Subsequently, it highlights the sign ificant
contemporary development to tax different aspects of a single commercial
transactionunder both the service and the sales tax nets between the Union
and the state Governments and the levy of service taxes upon transactions
which are clearly of diffrent character.With the highestjudicialauthorityof
the land overlooking vital distinctionsand ignoring the balance of competence
between the Union and the states, even more commercial transactionsmay
fall susceptible to the Parliament'surge to maximise revenue in this manner.
A development, which the authorsargue, was perhaps dealt much betterby
the early benches of the Supreme Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
World over, taxation has been accepted as a mechanism to rectify market
imperfections and bring in economic stability. As governments get more profligate,
especially in countries like ours where the attitude has been to resort to the power
of taxation to make up for losses sustained by the exchequer for reasons legitimate
or otherwise, service tax has been the Brahmastrafor the Indian government since
1994. Unfortunately, law and economics are strange bed fellows, and what may
be useful for the government to augment its revenues may not survive the test of
constitutionality
The liberalisation era has been witness to dynamic changes in the banking and
information technology sector. New market Instruments which are quite hybrid
in their design, and products from the IT and ITES sectors whose legal character
leave the most eminent jurists in doubt, have given rise to enormous complexities
and consequential constitutional challenges. When the taxman goes after these
transactions, the most obvious question is, does the law maker have the competence
to levy the tax or fee in question? This arises due to the federal character of the
Indian Constitution, which envisages mutually exclusive legislative competence,
wherein taxing entries are divided between the Union and State lists (Lists 1 and

2 of the VIIth Schedule). While interpreting the constitutionality of any new tax, it
is necessary to remember that there is no scope for any overlap between the taxing
entries in the Union list and those in the State list. The challenge to taxation on the
ground of legislative competence is all the more important, as the other protective
barrier, being the Fundamental Rights chapter in Part MI,offers very little effective
protection in the case of taxing statutes. We have, in the past, been witness to
inordinately high rates of taxation, which Courts have considered constitutionally
valid when tested on the touchstone of Articles 14, 19 and 21.
1

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v, Union of India, (2006) 3 SCC 1 [Supreme Court of India].
[Hereinafter, "BSNL v. UO']
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In this article we examine the constitutional framework for levy of service tax
by the Union and sales tax by the states. We contend that any new transaction has
to be taxed either under one or the other legislation, and not taxable under both. In
our view, the recent trend wherein both the Union and the States are mongering
to augment their revenues by targeting the very same transaction for the purpose
of sales and service tax, will have detrimental consequences for the industry
concerned. This stance taken by governments - both at the States and the Centre
- needs a serious relook. In our earnest view, Courts have unfortunately failed,
despite repeated constitutional challenges, to appreciate the existing constitutional
limitations and to prioritise them over the economic necessities and hardships that
the government may be facing. In short, taxes seem to trump rights even though
the Constitution promises otherwise.

II. RESTRICTIONS ON THE POWER TO TAX- THE DECISION IN

GA'oNv Drmarxnz
Immediately after independence, there was a scamper by various State
Governments to expand the definition of'sale' in Entry 54 of List [1 for the purpose
of levy of sales tax. In one such early attempt in 1947, the State of Madras enlarged
the definition of sale contained in Section 2(h) of the Madras General Sales Tax, Act,
1939. The earlier definition was the same as that contained in the Sale of Goods Act
1930, Le, "every transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of
trade or businessfor cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration".This
definition was sought to be expanded to include "a transfer of property in goods
involved in the execution of works contract." This expansion posed a major threat to the
construction industry, as most works were being executed on works contract basis
by the builders, and resulted in a constitutional challenge to the 1947 amendment.
By the time this case came up for hearing before the Supreme Court, various other
States had also attempted similar expansion of taxing powers under Entry 54 by
amending and enlarging the definition of sale.
In a seminal decision by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in The
State of Madrasv. Cannon Dunkerley & Co., (Madras)Ltd.,2 it was held that the power

2

The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co., (Madras) Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 560
[Supreme Court of India]. [Hereinafter, "Gannon Dunkerley"] The State went on
appeal as a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, in a path breaking judgment
which deserves reading for its sound legal and analytical reasoning, held the Madras
Amendment to be ultra vires the taxing power vested in Entry 48 of List II of VIIth
Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935.
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of States to levy tax on the sale of goods, contained in Entry 483 of List 11 of the
Seventh Schedule in the Government of India Act, 1935, was limited in its own
terms by two words in that entry, 'sale' and 'goods'. If a transaction did not count
as a 'sale', the States would not have the competence to levy sales tax. Similarly,
if the object of the sale was not 'goods', there would not be any competence to
levy sales tax. The contention of the States was that the word 'sale' must be given
a liberal, and not a narrow, construction. While accepting the correctness of this
submission, the Supreme Court held that the word 'sale' must still be construed in
its legal sense, and not in the popular sense. Therefore, though the popular sense
of this word would include transactions where title in the property fails to pass
as an outcome of the transaction, the legal sense would not. The Supreme Court
also rejected the submission of the States that 'sale' in Entry 48 of List II, Schedule
VII, Government of India Act, 1935, would have a different meaning from that
in the Sale of Goods Act,1930, due to the difference in objective. The States had
contended that the objective of the latter enactment was to define the rights of
parties to a contract, while that of sales tax legislation was to bring money into the
coffers of a State. The Supreme Court considered this immaterial due to the total
absence of any legislative practise pertaining to Entry 48 before its introduction
in the Government of India Act, 1935.
The Court hence concluded that the word 'sale' in its legal sense would
have the same meaning as in the law relating to sale of goods. Sale, according to
the Court, had to be an agreement whereby the seller transferred the property in
goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price. The Court further went
on to explain that only property which satisfied the following attributes would
qualify as goods, namely, (i) having utility, (ii) capable of being bought and sold,
and (iii) capable of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed.
Applying the above parameters, the Court held that the Madras Amendment would
fall outside the purview of Entry 48, since a works contract was not an agreement
to transfer the property in the materials used for the construction activity. In
effect, the Court was making it clear that while the Legislature and the Executive
may be faced with concerns such as augmenting of revenues, the function of the
Court was only to ensure strict compliance with the constitutional law of the land.
Solutions to polycentric problems would have to still fit within the parameters of
constitutionality.

3

The predecessor to Entry K List II, Schedule VII, The Constitution of India, 1950.

Vol. 23(2)

National Law School of India Review

III. RESTRICTIONS

2.012

POST GANNON DUNKERLEY AND THE

CALL FOR REFORM

The strict view taken by the Court in the above decision placed important
restrictions on the unbridled power that States thought they could arrogate for
themselves while levying taxes on sale of goods. Over time, different kinds of
transactions were held to fall outside the scope of 'sale' and as a natural corollary,
outside the purview of the States' taxing powers under Entry 54 of List II,Sch.ViI/
relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gannon Dunkerley. In New India
Sugar Mills Ltd. v,Commr. of Sales Tax, Bihar,' the Supreme Court took the view that,

in the case of transfer of controlled commodities in pursuance of a direction under
a control order, the element of volition by the seller, or mutual assent, was absent
and therefore there was no sale as defined in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Though
this was watered down considerably by a 7-judge Bench decision in Vishnu Agencies
v.C.O,, the framework continued to be the same, i.e. whether the transaction
in question was a 'sale' as defined in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and imported
to Entry 54 vide the decision in Gannon Dunkerley. Despite questions being raised
in Vishnu Agencies as to the correctness of the view taken in Gannon Dunkerley,7 it
continued to be good law.'
Applying this framework, in Dy. C.T.O. v. Enfield India Ltd.,9 it was held that
canteen operations run by a cooperative society for the benefit of its members
would not amount to sale of food articles to the members by the society. The
4

5
6
7

8

9

Entry 54 was couched in the same language as Entry 48 in the Government of India

Act, the scope of which came up for consideration in Gannon Dunkerley.
New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v.Commr. of Sales Tax, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1207 [Supreme
Court of India],
Vishnu Agencies v. C.T.O., AIR 1978 SC 449 [Supreme Court of India]. [Hereinafter,
"Vishnu Agencies"
In the words of the Court: "The view expressed in Gannon Dunkerley that the words

"sale of goods" in entry 48 must be interpreted in the sense which they bear in the Sale

of Goods Act, 1930 and that the meaning of those words should not be left to fluctuate
with the definition of 'sale' in laws relating to sales of goods which might be in force
for the time being may, with respect bear further consideration but that may have to
await a more suitable occasion,"
The majority in Vishnu Agencies concluded so: "In other words, the effect of the
construction which the Court put on the words of Entry 48 in Gannon Dunkerley is
that a sale is necessarily a consensual transaction and if the parties have no volition
or option to bargain, there can be no sale. For the present purposes, this view may be
assumed to reflect the correct legal position but even so, the transactions which are
the subject matter of these appeals will amount to sales."
Dy. C.T.O. v. Enfield India Ltd., AIR 1968 SC 838 [Supreme Court of India].
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Court felt that there was no transfer of property in such arrangements, and that
the society could at best be treated as an agent whose services were utilised by the
members for fulfilling their needs. Similarly, in K.L. Jaharv. Dy. C.T.O., 0 it was held
by another Constitution Bench, after relying on the decision in Gannon Dunkerey,
that hire-purchase transactions cannot be constitutionally subject to sales tax. In
the Court's view, there was no transfer of property at the time of entering into the
hire purchase transaction, and hence no 'sale'. It was also specifically contended
that the decision in Cannon Dunkerley requires reconsideration, an argument that
was rejected by the Constitution Bench on the ground that this decision had held
the field for many years and also found acceptance in some later decisions.
In Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi," the Supreme
Court held that there was no sale when food and drink were supplied to guests
residing in a hotel and that supply of meals was essentially in the nature of a
service provided to the guests and could not be identified as a transaction of sale.
The Court rejected the contention of the revenue that they were entitled to split
up the transaction into two parts, one of service and the other of sale of foodstuffs.
In A.V Meiyappan v, Commr. Of Commercial Taxes, 2 the Madras High Court held
that an operational lease for 49 years of the negative print of a film would not
amount to a sale as there was only transfer of the right to use, but no transfer of
the property in the negatives.
The Law Commission of India, taking a note of these and other judgments
where the principle laid down in Gannon Dunkerley was used to treat different
transactions as outside the purview of 'sale' for purposes of sales tax levy,13
suggested an amendment to the Constitution wherein the sales tax net would
be widened to cover certain categories of these transactions. This led to the
introduction of Article 366(29A) vide the Constitution (Forty Sixth Amendment)
Act, 1982, which reads as follows:366. Definitions. - In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise
requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby
respectively assigned to them, that is to say 10
11

K.L. Johar v. Dy. C.T.Q., AIR 1965 SC 1082 [Supreme Court of India].
Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1978) 4 SCC36 [Supreme
Court of India). See also State of Punjab v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd., (1972) 1 SCC
472 [Supreme Court of Indiaj.
12 A.V. Meiyappan v. Commr. Of Commercial Taxes, AIR 1969 Mad 284 [Madras High
Court].
13 See 610 Report of the Law Commission of India (1974), available at http://
lawconuaissionofindia.nic in/51-100/report6l.pdf.
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(29-A) 'tax on the sale or purchase of goods' includes (a) a tax on the transfer, otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, of
property in any goods for cash, deferred payment or other valuable
consideration;
(b) a tax on the transferof property in goods (whetheras goods or in some
otherform) involved in the execution of a works contract;
(c) a tax on the delivery ofgoods on hire-purchaseor any system ofpayment
by instalments;
()

a tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose
(whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or
other valuable consideration;
(e) a tax on the supply ofgoods by any unincorporatedassociationor body
of persons to a member therefore for cash, deferred payment or other
valuable consideration;
(f a tax on the supply, by way of or as part of any service or in any
other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article
for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating),
where such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment or other
valuable consideration,and such transfer, delivery or supply of any
goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making
the transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by the
person to whom such transfer,delivery or supply is made.

IV. ARTICLE 366(29A)

-

CHALLENGED AND UPHELD

The introduction of this provision had monumental significance for several
industries where the template transactions were structured in such fashion to
get around the definition of 'sale'. The construction industry was one of the most
affected, since works contracts were now sought to be covered, for purposes of
sales tax, under clause (b) of Article 366(29A). Soon enough, the Constitution
(Forty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1982, was challenged in Builders' Associationof India
v. Union of India," on the ground that ratification by the legislatures of one-half
of the States was not obtained, This was a rather weak ground of challenge and
was not sustained by the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court made
some pertinent observations as to the object behind Article 366(29-A), which are
reproduced below:
14

Builders' Association of India v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 1371 [Supreme Court of
India].
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"The object of the new definition introduced in Clause (29A) of Article
366 of the Constitution is, therefore, to enlarge the scope of 'tax on sale or
purchase of goods' wherever it occurs in the Constitution so that it may
include within its scope the transfer, delivery or supply of goods that may
take place under any of the transactionsreferred to in Sub-clauses (a) to (0
thereofwherever such transfer,delivery or supply becomes subject to levy of
sales tax. So construed the expression 'tax on the sale or purchase ofgoods'
in Entry 54 of the State List, therefore, includes a tax on the transfer of
property in goods (whether as goods or in some otherform) involved in the
execution of a works contractalso. The tax leviable by virtue of Sub-clause
(b)of Clause (29-A) of Article 366 of the Constitution thus becomes subject
to the same discipline to which any levy under Entry 54 of the State List is
made subject to under the Constitution.
We are surprisedat the attitudeof the States which have putforward theplea
that on the passingof the 46th Amendment the Constitutionhad conferredon
the States a largerfreedom than what they had before in regardto their power
to levy sales-tax under Entry 54 of the State List. The 46th Amendment
does no more than making it possiblefor the States to levy sales tax on the
price of goods and materials used in works contracts as if there was a sale of
such goods and materials. We do not accept the argument that Sub-clause
(b) of Article 366(29A) should be read as being equivalent to a separate
entry in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution enabling the
States to levy tax on sales and purchases independent of Entry 54 thereof.
As the Constitution exists today, the power of the States to levy taxes on
sales and purchases of goods including the 'deemed' sales and purchasesof
goods under Clause (29A) of Article 366 is to be found only in Entry 54
and not outside it."
Thus, the Court made it amply clear that all constitutional restrictions on the
power of taxation would continue post the introduction of Article 366(29A) and
that this provision was meant to expand the scope of Entry 54 of List Ii without
creating a separate field of taxation. It is relevant to mention here that amending
the Constitution in this fashion, i.e. by expanding the scope of sales tax levy, was
one of the three possible solutions mooted in the 61"1 Law Commission Report.
One other was to vest the power of taxation of all these sui generis or 'non-sale'
transactions with the Parliament, an option which Parliament impliedly ruled
against by introducing Article 366(29A). In fact, the Law Commission noted that
the power to tax work contracts would, in the absence of any enlargement of the
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power under Entry 54 of List II, continue to vest with Parliament under Entry 97
of List 1.1 Despite having such power, Parliament chose to expand the scope of
'sale' under Entry 54 of List II, probably keeping in mind political and financial
exigencies. This course of action amounted to a waiver by Parliament of any
powers of taxation that they may have had earlier in respect of these transactions.
Unfortunately, with the introduction of the service tax levy, this waiver has been
indirectly circumvented.

V. SERVICE TAx AN

PARUAMENT'S COMPETENCE

With the opening up of the Indian economy, services sector assumed a lot
of significance both globally and locally. The Government of India felt that a tax
on services, in line with international practise, would result in augmenting the
revenue of the Union as well as bringing within the tax net various transactions
that were so far not covered within the existing indirect taxes such as central excise
(due to the absence of any 'manufacture' in many of these service transactions),
customs, or sales tax. While one cannot find any fault with this policy decision of
the Government, service tax has over time been extended to cover transactions
that are already prone to sales tax. Moreover, the Union has not even applied its
mind to whether the transaction in question is a composite contract or a contract
of sale simpliciter, when adding new heads of service tax.
Before a scrutiny of these heads of service tax, it is imperative to take a quick
look at the legislative competence for levy of service tax. Service tax was introduced
for the first time in 1994, when there was no separate entry in the Constitution
covering 'taxes on services'. Hence, Parliament could exercise its power of taxation
over services only under Entry 97 of List I, being the residuary powers vested
in Parliament, 1 ' The exercise of such residuary powers is specifically provided
for in Article 248, where it is made clear that such residuary powers can only be
exercised "with respect to any matter not enumerated in the ConcurrentList or the State
List." The correct approach when tracing legislative competence to Entry 97 of List
I has been clarified in InternationalTourist Corporation v. State of Haryana.'Y Here,
the Supreme Court was faced with the submission that State Legislatures would
15

16
17

See 611 Report of the Law Commission of India, para 1A.22 (1974), available at http://

lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/report61,pdf.
Entry 97, List I,Schedule VII, The Constitution of India, 1950. This includes any other
matter not enumerated in List IIor List III including any tax not mentioned in either
of those Lists.
International Tourist Corporation v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 774 [Supreme Court
of India].
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be incompetent to extend their taxing power over passengers and goods to those
commuting or being transported on the National Highways running within the
territories of these States, as Parliament alone had exclusive jurisdiction under
Entry 23 read with Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
to legislate in respect of National Highways, including levy of taxes on goods and
passengers carried on National Highways. While rejecting this contention, the
Supreme Court protected the federal framework in our Constitution by holding
that the scope of residuary powers could not be expansively interpreted to the
extent of whittling down the powers of the State legislature. It was categorically
stated that Parliament could resort to its residuary powers only when the legislative
incompetence of the State legislatures had been clearly established by virtue of the
absence of relevant entries in Lists 11 and Ill. As a necessary corollary, if a specific
taxing power is already covered in List II, the same tax cannot be imposed again
under Entry 97.
Entry 92C was inserted subsequently vide the Constitution (Eighty-eighth
Amendment) Act, 2003, though this provision has not been notified as yet. Ignoring
this vital fact, the Supreme Court, in All India Federationof Tax Practitionersv, Union
of India," has traced the competence of Parliament to levy service tax, to this entry.
Even assuming for a moment the correctness of this view, the scheme under our
Constitution, well articulated in Article 246, is that Parliament is supreme in its
own sphere being List I of the VIth Schedule, while the States are supreme in their
own sphere being List II of the same Schedule. The necessary corollary to this is
that a tax on the sale of goods under Entry 54 of List II belongs to the exclusive
domain of the States, and Parliament has no competence to levy any tax on the
same transaction of sale. This position will not alter whether service tax is levied
under Entry 97 or under Entry 92C of List I. Parliament however chose to exceed
the scope of its jurisdiction, as seen from the unfolding of events.

VI.

THE EXTENSION OF SERVICE TAX TO 'DEEMED SALES'

Kalyana Mandapams" were among the first to suffer from the proclivity
of the Union to cover 'deemed sale' transactions within the service tax net. The
taxable service in relation to these transactions was the "service provided to a client,
by a Mandapam- keeper in relation to the use of a Mandapam in any manner including the
facilities provided to the client in relation to such use and also the services, if any, rendered
as a caterer." This levy was challenged in Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Assocn. v.
18 All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v.Union of India, (2007)7 SCC 527 [Supreme
Court of India].
19

English translation of which would mean 'marriage halls'.
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Union of lndia,interalia on the ground that supply of food articles was already
covered within the purview of sales tax vide Article 366(29A)(f) of the Constitution.
Since the transaction was reserved for the exclusive domain of the States under
Entry 54 of List 1 by way of the Constitution (Forty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1982,
it was constitutionally impermissible to levy service tax on any services rendered
in connection with the supply of food and drinks, according to the Petitioner.
This was, in other words, the 'waiver' argument raised in the previous section.
Rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court reasoned that various aspects of
the same transaction could be taxed under various taxing statutes by different
taxing authorities and that there was a service aspect to the activity carried on
by the petitioner and its members. The judgment however, does not clearly state
as to how Parliament had discharged its burden of illustrating the existence of a
specific service element, independent of the element of sale as covered in Article
366(29A). There is a discussion about the differences between 'outdoor catering' and
restaurants at the end of which, it has been concluded that "outdoor cateringhas an
element ofpersonalized service provided to the customer Clearly the service element is more
weighty, visible and predominant in the case of outdoor catering," However, the Court
did precious little to show the exact nature of this service element independent of
the supply of food and drinks, which was already covered within Article 366(29A).
This error in the approach by the Supreme Court in Kalyana Mandapam Assocn.,2'
has been subsequently used to affirm the levy of service tax on various transactions
where the service element is, if at all present, quite hazy.
A classic example is the treatment of hire-purchase transactions. Parliament
introduced "banking and other financial services" in 2001, wherein financial leasing
services, includingequipment leasingand hire-purchaseby a body corporate,were sought
to be covered within the service tax net. On the face of it, these transactions were
covered under Article 366(29A)(c) and sales tax was also being collected. Aggrieved
parties, such as non banking finance companies, challenged this levy of service
tax before the Kerala and Madras High Courts, both of which upheld the levy.
The reasoning was the same, being that aspect theory permitted taxation by two
different legislatures over two different aspects of the same transaction. Hence,
the service aspect and sale aspect of hire-purchase transactions could be taxed by
Parliament and State Legislatures respectively. This view has now been upheld
by the Supreme Court in Association of Leasing and Financial Service Companies v.
Union of India.Y
20

Tamil Nadu Kalyana MandapamAssocn. v.Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 3757 [Supreme
Court of India]. [Hereinafter, "Kalyana MandapamAssocn."
21 Kalyana Mandapam Asaocn., AIR 2004 SC 3757 [Supreme Court of India].
22 Association of Leasing and Financial Service Companies v. Union of India, (2011) 2
SCC 352 [Supreme Court of India]. [Hereinafter, "Leasing and FinancialService"]
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Strangely, most of the reasoning in the above decision of the Supreme
Court harps on the presence of a service element to hire-purchase transactions
independent of Article 36(29A)(c), but without any identification of what that
distinguishable service element is. Supreme Court has held that the impugned
provision operates qua an activity of funding/financing of equipment/asset under
equipment leasing under which a lessee is free to select, order, take delivery and
maintain the asset. In the view of the Court, the Non Banking Finance Companies
make arrangements for the finance, accept invoices from the vendor and paythe
vendor, thereby rendering financial services to their customers. This begs the
question: what else does one mean by a hire-purchase transaction? It is exactly
the same activity over which State legislatures levy sales tax.
The reasoning gets even more interesting as the Supreme Court goes on to
place reliance on a Notification and a Circular (Notification No. 4/2006 - Service
Tax dated 1.3.2006, and Circular F.No.B.11/1/2001-TRU dated 9.7.2001) issued
by the Tax Research Unit, which concede that service tax in the case of financial
leasing, including equipment leasing and hire-purchase, will be leviable only on
the lease management fees/ processing fees/ documentation charges recovered
at the time of entering into the agreement and on the finance/interest charges
recovered in equated monthly instalments, and not on the principal amount. This
approach by the Supreme Court is without any basis in law, as the constitutional
validity of a provision cannot be decided based on the exemptions conferred by
the Executive. In all likelihood, the exemption will be rescinded when the Union
finds it economically sensible to collect more tax. As already stated above, good
economics and correct law are not always the best of blood brothers.
Similarly, Parliament has been hounding the software industry with a tax
on services provided to a person, including "acquiring the right to use information
technology software for commercial exploitation including right to reproduce,distribute
and sell information technology software and right to use software components for the
creation of and inclusion in other information technology software products."13 On the
basis of this charging provision, service tax was sought to be imposed on sale of
canned and customised software. Promptly, the industry took steps to challenge
the same by filing a writ petition in the Madras High Court. The contention taken
up by the petitioner association, in Infotech Software Dealers Association v. Union
of India," was that the transfer of the right to use goods was already covered
23
24

§ 65(105)(zzzze), The Finance Act, 1994. The word 'acquiring' has been subsequently
replaced with 'providing'.
Infotech Software Dealers Association v. Union of India, (2010) 34 VST 133 (Madras
High Court).

Vol. 23(2)

NationalLaw School of India Review

2012

within 'deemed sale' under Article 366(29A)(d) and hence could not be subject to
service tax. Rejecting this contention, the High Court again reasoned that there
was a service element in these transactions under which software was licensed to
the end user by members of the petitioner association. In this case too, the High
Court hardly pointed out the specific service element in the transfer of canned or
customised software apart from stating that the end user was being permitted to
use the software by purchasing the Compact Discs or other storage media, or by
downloading the software through interet. This was precisely the activity for
which sales tax was already being levied on the industry. If one were to extend
the logic applied in all the above cases, the day is not far when shopkeepers will
be covered under 'shopkeeper services' for providing access to goods that ate
sold in the, shopi!

VII.

THE EXTENSION OF SERVICE TAX TO OTHER

TRANSACTIONS OF A NON-SERVICE CHARACTER
Apart from transactions of sale / 'deemed sale' that have been held to fall
within the service tax net, some other transactions have also been absurdly brought
within the purview of service tax. A classic case is that of service tax on renting
of immovable property. Parliament, in its strange wisdom, thought that mere
renting of property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce is
a service, and imposed service tax on the same. 5 Earlier, the Union had attempted
to do the same vide a notification followed by a circular, which was struck down
by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Home Solution Retail India Ltd. v.
Union of India.26 The Delhi High Court had correctly reasoned that service tax is a
value added tax, and there was no value addition in merely renting out premises.
There had to be some additional service offered in connection with the rental.
After the Finance Act, 1994, was amended to legislatively provide for what
was contained in the invalidated notification and circular, various aggrieved parties
approached different High Courts challenging the amendment. The primary
contention was that service tax on mere renting of immovable property would
amount to a tax under Entry 49 of List II, i.e. a tax on land and buildings, and that
25
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this was outside the competence of Parliament. Rejecting this contention, a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court has, very recently in Retailers Association of India
v.Union of India, upheld the validity of this levy. In some ways, the choices were
limited for the Bombay High Court as Supreme Court had already closed its eyes
to the clear division of powers between the Union and State List. However, it was
an excellent opportunity which the High Court sadly lost, to clarify the boundaries
of the aspect theory which has time and again been repeated like a mantra to
permit Parliamentary overlap into taxing entries reserved for the States. Mere
repetition of the well-established principle that legislative entries must receive
liberal construction does not address the issue of whether a frivolous aspect can
be used to indirectly do what cannot be directly done. It is also pertinent to note
that no overlap is permissible at all in the case of taxing entries,2 and to that extent,
the principle of liberal construction does not apply with the same flexibility as
with other legislative entries.

VIII. SUPREME COURT IGNORES THE CORRECT
EXPOSITION OF LAW IN BSNL v. UNION OF INDIA' 9
It is not our contention that the Supreme Court has failed to appreciate the
constitutional scheme or the purpose behind the introduction of Article 366(29A).
At least in one decision, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v.Union of India,3" a three Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court has correctly analysed the scope of Article 366(29A).
This case arose from a challenge to the imposition of sales tax on mobile operators.
The contention of the State legislatures was that SIM cards were being transferred
in order to activate the cellular services and such SIM cards being goods, sales tax
would be attracted. While rejecting this contention and holding that the providing
of cellular services would fall within the exclusive domain of Parliament, the
Supreme Court embarked on an analysis of Article 366(29A). After scrutinising
each clause of this Article, Ruma Pal, J. speaking for the majority, held:
"Clause (a) covers a situationwhere the consensual element is lacking. This normally
takes place in an involuntarysale. Clause (b)
covers cases relatingto works contracts.This
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was the particularfact situation which the Court was faced with in Cannon Dunkerley
and which the Court had held was not a sale. The effect in law of a transfer of property in
goods involved in the execution of the works contractwas by this amendment deemed to
be a sale. To that extent the decision in Gannon Dunkerley was directlyovercome. Clause
(c) deals with hire purchase where the title to the goods is not transferred. Yet by fiction of
law, it is treatedas a sale. Similarly the title to the goods under Clause (d) remains with the
transferorwho only transfers the right to use the goods to the purchaser.Inother words,
contrary to A.V Meiyappan's decision a lease of a negative print of a picture would be
a sale. Clause (e)
covers cases which in law may not have amounted to sale because the
member of an incorporatedassociationwould have in a sense been both the supplierand
the recipientof the supply of goods. Now such transactions are deemed sales. Clause (9
pertains to contracts which had been held not to amount to a sale in State of Punjab v.
Associated Hotels of India Ltd. That decision has by this clausebeen effectively legislatively
invalidated.
All the clausesofArtide 366(29A) serve to bring transactionswhere one or
more of the essential ingredientsof a sale as defined in the Sale of Goods Act
1930 are absent, within the ambit of purchaseand sales for the purposes of
levy of sales tax. To this extent only is the principle enunciated in Gannon
Dunkerley limited. The amendment especially allows specific composite
contracts viz. works contracts (Clause (b)), hire purchase contracts (Clause
(c)), catering contracts (Clause (e)) by legal fiction to be divisible contracts
where the sale element could be isolated and be subjected to sales tax.
Cannon Dunkerley survived the 46th Constitutional Amendment in
two respects. First with regard to the definition of 'sale' for the purposes
of the Constitution in general and for the purposes of Entry 54 of List
II in particularexcept to the extent that the clauses in Article 366(29A)
operate ........ The second respect in which Cannon Dunkerley has survived
is with reference to the dominant nature test to be applied to a composite
transactionnot covered by Article 366(29A). Transactionswhich aremutant
sales are limited to the clauses of Article 366(29A). All other transactions
would have to qualify as sales within the meaning of Sales of Goods Act
1930for the purpose of levy of sales tax.
Of all the different kinds of composite transactions the drafters of the 46th
Amendment chose three specific situations,a works contract,a hire purchase
con tract and a catering con tract to bring within the fiction of a deemed
sale. Of these three, the first and third involve a kind of service and
sale at the same time. Apartfrom these two cases where splitting of the
service and supply has been constitutionallypermitted in clauses (b)
and
(g) of Clause 29A of Article 366, there is no other servicewhich has been
permitted to be so split."

Sale for you, Service for Him, Both for the Taiman!
Four things are crystal clear from the above statement of law: (i) all 'deemed
sales' today fall within the purview of sale, but not all of them are composite in
character. Cases where the consensual element is lacking [cl. (a)], or there is only a
transfer of the right to use [cl. (d)], or there is a supply of goods to oneself [cl. (e)]
are not composite but covered within Article 366(29A) for different reasons while
works contracts [cl. (b)], hire purchase contracts (cl. (c)], and catering contracts
[cl. (f), wrny mentioned as cl. (e) in the judgment] are composite in character and
brought specifically within the ambit of Article 366(29A) so that the sale aspect
of these transactions can be taxed by the State Legislatures. So in the case of the
first set of transactions, there is no question of any service aspect as the entire
transaction is deemed to be a sale; (ii) even in the case of composite contracts, i.e.
the second set of transactions, the legal fiction only extends-to the extent of making
it possible to isolate the sale element for the purposes of taxation. If the entire
transaction is covered within the sweep of Article 366(29A), it will exclusively
fall within the legislative domain of the State legislatures. The burden is on the
concerned Legislature to show the existence of a specific sale or service element
so as to tax the same; (iii) of the three transactions in the second set, onlyworks
contract and catering contracts involve a kind of service and sale at the same time.
Hire purchase contracts do not involve a service element; (iv) Gannon Dunkerley
holds good for the purpose of determining competence to levy sales tax in so far
as transactions not covered under Article 366(29A) are concerned.
Viewed from this perspective, the final outcome arrived at by the Supreme
Court in KalyanaMandapamAssocn. ,31 can be justified since it was a case involving
catering contracts as part of the Kalyana Mandapamservices. However, the approach
and reasoning of the Supreme Court in this case is still wrong. The application
of aspect theory without an understanding of the nuances behind this theory has
resulted in great damage as transactions involving hire-purchase and transfer of
right to use have also been brought within the service tax net, incorrectly applying
the aspect theory. The decision in BSNL v. UOI, has been the casualty in this
process.
Another decision of the Supreme Court, though not one arising gut of a
constitutional challenge, where the analysis has been quite clear, is the decision in
Imagic CreativePvt. Ltd. v. Commr. Of CommercialTaxes The Supreme Court clarified
in this case that the levies of service tax and sales tax are mutually exclusive.
Therefore, they should be held to be applicable having regard to the respective
31
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parameters of service tax and sales tax as envisaged in a composite contract. Thus,
in a composite contract, if the charge of the tax is on the entire contract value and
not the sale or service element as the case may be, it would amount to an invalid
levy . 4 Unfortunately, this principle was not kept in mind while deciding Leasing
and Financial Service. 5 The Supreme Court did not examine closely the service
element in the hire purchase transaction at all, even though it was shown that the
entire interest component was already being subject to sales tax.
It is also pertinent at this juncture to highlight the decision of the Supreme
Court in Cannon Dunkerley v. State of Rajasthan,3 where it was held that the cost
of incorporation of the goods could not be included for the purposes of sales tax
levy over works contracts in accordance with Article 366(29A) read with Entry
54 of List II, since such cost of incorporation "forms part of the contract relating to
work and labour which is distinctfrom the contractfor transfer of property in goods."
When States have the power to levy sales tax only over the proportion of the
transaction consideration attributable to the sale (being the entire transaction value
in the case of hire-purchase transactionsr) it is baffling as to how Parliament will
have competence to levy service tax over hire-purchase transactions when the
consolidated proceeds, including the hire charges, is subject to sales tax!!

IX. ASPECT

THEORY AND ITS INCORRECT APPLICATION

The reluctance of the Supreme Court to strike down invalid levies of service
tax such as the ones covered in the preceding sections of this essay, stems largely
from the incorrect application of the aspect theory. This import from Canadian
constitutional law hit Indian shores through the decision in Federationof Hotel &
RestaurantAssociation of India v. Union of India.m In this case, while upholding the
levy of expenditure tax, the Supreme Court held that this tax was on the aspect of
expenditure and hence not covered within Entry 62 of List II, pertaining to taxes
on luxuries. Therefore, Parliament was considered competent to levy Expenditure
Tax under Entry 97 of List I.
34
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There are strong reasons for limiting, if not negating, the scope and
applicability of the aspect theory in the context of our constitutional scheme. The
double aspect theory" was judicially evolved in Canada to specifically address
the problem created by distribution of legislative powers between the Federation
and the Provinces. This doctrine appears to have been stated for the first time in
Hodge v.The Queen,' in the following words: "subjects which in one aspect and for
one purposefall within sect. 92, may in another aspectand for anotherpurposefall within
sect. 91." It follows from this theory that two relatively similar rules or sets of rules
may validly be found, one in legislation within exclusive federal jurisdiction, and
the other in legislation within exclusive provincial jurisdiction, because they are
enacted for different purposes and in different legislative contexts which give,
them distinct constitutional characterizations.
As explained by the Canadian Supreme Court in Multiple Access Ltd. v.
McCutcheon," when the court considers that the federal and provincial features of
the challenged rule are of roughly equivalent importance so that neither should
be ignored respecting the division of legislative powers, the decision is made that
the challenged rule could be enacted by either the federal Parliament or provincial
legislature. So, it is seen that the 'double aspect' doctrine as evolved in Canada
allows both legislatures to enact the same rule, as opposed to the doctrine as used
by the Indian Supreme Court in FHRAIv. UOIV Therefore, before blindly applying
this doctrine to the Indian constitutional context, it is imperative to understand
the constitutional scheme in Canada.
Section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, of Canada vests power in the
Parliament of Canada to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of
Canada, in relation to all Matters not falling within the Classes of Subjects assigned
exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces and specifically, in relation to all
matters falling within the class of subjects enumerated in this Section. Section 92
vests power in the Provinces to make laws dealing with all matters of a local or
private nature in the Provinces, and specifically in relation to all matters falling
within the class of subjects enumerated in this Section. Section 91 also specifies that
any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section
shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Subjects of a local or private Nature
enumerated in Section 92. Thus, a very important difference emerges between the
39
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Indian and the Canadian Constitutions, being the absence of a Concurrent List
in the latter. In India, the founding fathers of our Constitution found it advisable
to enumerate separately those matters which both the Parliament and the State
Legislatures would have a legitimate interest in legislating upon. In this light of
the matter, there was no requirement of resorting to the double aspect theory and
thereby permitting both the Parliament and the State legislatures to enact laws on
certain subjects, in India. This was indeed what the "double aspect" theory was
capable of achieving as is seen from the warning issued by Viscount Haldane in
Attorney-Generalfor Canada v. Attorney-Generalfor Alberta," regarding this theory.
In the words of the learned judge, this doctrine "is now well established, but none
the less ought to be applied only with great caution".
The reason for such exercise of caution has been articulated by the Canadian
Supreme Court in Bell Canadav,Quebec." According to the Supreme Court, "the
reasonfor this caution is the extremely broad wording of the exclusive legislative powers
listed in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the risk that these two fields of
exclusive powers will be combined into a single more or less concurrentfield of powers
governed solely by the rule of paramountcyof federal legislation. Nothing could be more
directly contraryto the principle offederalism underlying the CanadianConstitution." In
order to avoid this consequence, the Supreme Court held that the double aspect
theory could only be invoked when it gave effect to the rule of exclusive fields of
jurisdiction, and only where the multiplicity of aspects was real and not merely
nominal.
The concurrent nature of the aspect theory is also evident from the fact that
the rules of federal paramountcy and repugnancy have found their significance
in cases relating to aspect theory. In O'Grady v,Sparling,. the Canadian Supreme
Court while repelling the contention that Section 55(1) of the Manitoba Highway
Traffic Act was in conflict with Section 221 of the Criminal Code held that the
former provision had for its true object, purpose, nature or character the regulation
and control of traffic on highways. In this connection, the Supreme Court held
that there was no conflict or repugnancy between these provisions and that both
provisions could operate concurrently. Similar reasoning was adopted by the
Canadian Supreme Court in Ross v,Registrarof Motor Vehicles,4 thus showing that
the double aspect doctrine in Canada is closely connected with the concurrent
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operation of federal and provincial legislation. It is a doctrine specially evolved
to recognize concurrent matters or fields in the absence of specific constitutional
sanction for the same.
Another factor to be kept in mind is the higher degree of detailing present
in the Vith Schedule to the Indian Constitution. While Sections 91 and 92 contain
a total of 43 entries, List I of our VIth Schedule alone contains 97 entries. More
importantly, when it comes to the power of taxation, the Indian constitutional
scheme is much more detailed inthe enumeration of various kinds of taxes that
may be levied by the Parliament and the State Legislature. Moreover, from the
conspicuous absence of any taxing entries from the Concurrent List, it is clear
that the framers of our Constitution did not envisage any "double aspect" taxing
statutes in the same sense as understood by the judiciary in Canada.
Without appreciating these fine, yet highly significant, distinctions between
our constitutional scheme and that of Canada, the Indian Supreme Court in FHRAI
v. UOl 47misapplied this doctrine and upheld the levy of Expenditure Tax. The
same error continues today when extending service tax levy to transactions that
have been deemed to be 'sale' under Article 366(29A). Unfortunately, no Indian
Court has embarked on a serious study of the aspect doctrine and examined its
true position and place in our constitutional scheme.
X. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The protector of citizen's rights, the Supreme Court of India, has failed in its
duty to correctly demarcate the scope of legislative power of Parliament vis-a-vis
theStates. The Supreme Court of the 1950s had, in Gannon Dunkerley, protected
industry against unbridled exercise of taxing powers by the State legislatures.
The Supreme Court had stood as a wall between the State and the citizen, finally
compelling Parliament to amend the Constitution. Unfortunately, the Court of
today has not been applying existing constitutional restrictions to prevent the
imposition of service tax on transactions already subject to sales tax and exclusively
covered under Entry 54 of List II. Ironically, it was so much easier for the Court
of the 50's to rule in favour of the revenue as exfacie there were no restrictions on
the scope and ambit of 'sale'. Despite this, the Supreme Court protected industry
by reading in a limitation, i.e. 'sale' has to be as defined in the Sale of Goods Act,
1930. The Court of today is confronted with a Constitution where exfacie certain
transactions have been reserved under Article 366(29A) within the exclusive
domain of the State legislatures. Yet they continue to rule in favour of the State.
47
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The decision in Leasing and FinancialService" is the last nail on the coffin, as
it is unlikely that Courts will, after this decision, come to the rescue of an assessee
who is subject to double taxation under the shadow of the aspect doctrine. This
approach has serious repercussions for the industry as well as the end user, since
the ultimate incidence of these indirect levies will have to be borne largely by the
customer and to some extent by the industry. One can only hope that Parliament
realises this just in time before any inflationary push is set in motion, and takes
necessary steps to at least ensure that the incidence of service tax is only on the
service element, if any, in these transactions and not on the entire value of the
contract. Though even this is not permissible as per our constitutional scheme
post the introduction of Article 366(29A), this is all that the citizen can expect
considering the wide leeway given to Parliament by the Supreme Court.
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